In a recent paper Hong and Shum (2006) present a structural methodology to estimate search cost distributions. We extend their approach to the case of oligopoly and present a new method to estimate search costs by maximum likelihood. We apply our method to a data set of online prices for different computer memory chips. The estimates suggest that on-line consumers have either quite high or quite low search costs so they either search exhaustively in the market or very little, for at most three prices. Search frictions confer a significant amount of market power to the firms: despite that more than 20 firms operate in each of the markets we study, price-cost margins are around 25%. Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit tests suggest we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the observed prices are generated by the model. The paper also illustrates how the structural methodology can be employed to simulate the effects of policy interventions.
Introduction
There is substantial evidence that the prices of seemingly homogeneous consumer goods are quite dispersed (see e.g. Stigler, 1961 Morgan and Scholten, 2004) . During the last twenty five years, economists have dedicated significant theoretical effort to explain this empirical regularity as an equilibrium phenomenon. One of the findings is that price dispersion can be sustained in equilibrium when some consumers observe several prices while other consumers observe only one price. Such unequal distribution of price information across consumers often arises in the market as a result of costly search (see e.g. Burdett and Judd, 1983; Rob, 1985; Stahl, 1989; Varian, 1980) .
In spite of the considerable theoretical effort, somewhat surprisingly, very little empirical work has focused on identifying and measuring search costs in real-world markets. From an applied point of view, this is certainly an omission because the predictions of the various theoretical models are quite sensitive to the height of the search cost in the market.
1 Since competition policy recommendations may depend on the amount of search in an industry, there is a need to develop methods to quantify search costs.
In a recent paper Hong and Shum (2006) present structural methodologies to retrieve information on search costs in markets for homogeneous goods. They show that firm and consumer equilibrium behavior imposes enough structure on the data to allow for the estimation of search costs using only observed prices. Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004) show that when price and quantity data are available, this methodology can be extended to richer settings where price variation is not only caused by search frictions but also by quality differences across products.
The nonsequential search model studied by Hong and Shum (2006) generalizes Burdett and Judd (1983) seminal paper by introducing search cost heterogeneity. The market is operated by a continuum of firms, which compete by setting prices. Consumers with heterogeneous search costs search to discover prices and buy from the cheapest firm they observe.
In equilibrium, some consumers do not search whereas others do and this leads to price dis-persion. Hong and Shum formulate the estimation of the unknown search cost distribution as a two-step procedure. They first estimate the parameters of the equilibrium price distribution by maximum empirical likelihood (MEL). To do this, they exploit equilibrium behavior to obtain a (potentially infinitely large) number of moment conditions. The estimates of the parameters of the price cdf give the height of the search cost distribution evaluated at a series of cut-off points. In the second step, these cut-off points are estimated directly from the empirical cdf of prices. This method is interesting but it requires to solve a highly dimensional optimization problem, which is computationally quite demanding. Indeed, in practice, only a few parameters of the price distribution can be estimated; without a priori good information about search costs, discarding parameters has the problem of introducing biases in the estimates.
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In this paper we present an alternative way, by maximum likelihood (ML), to estimate an oligopoly version of the nonsequential search model of Burdett and Judd (1983) . We first estimate the parameters of the price distribution by ML. To do this, we compute the likelihood of a price as a function of the distribution of prices and exploit the equilibrium constancy-of-profits condition to numerically calculate the value of the price cdf. Once we obtain a ML-estimate of the price distribution, we introduce a method to calculate the cut-off points of the search cost distribution as a function of the ML estimate of the price cdf. In this way, by the invariance property of ML estimation, the estimates of the cut-off points of the search cost distribution are also ML so the asymptotic theory for computing standard errors of and for conducting tests of hypotheses on the estimates of the search cost distribution remains standard. In addition, our method is relatively easy to implement in practice and we have not observed any numerical difficulties.
The model we study is an oligopolistic version of Burdett and Judd (1983) . Vis-à-vis the competitive case studied by Hong and Shum (2006) , the oligopoly model has the advantage that it captures variation in prices that is due to variation in the number of competitors; this makes our model useful for the study of competition policy issues. If the econometrician knows there are N firms operating in a market then he/she knows consumers will search up to a maximum of N prices. As a result, independently of the number of prices the econometrician actually observes, we can estimate the relevant number of parameters of the price distribution. In this way we learn about the distribution of search costs at all relevant quantiles. In particular, we find out how much search is conducted by consumers who search thoroughly and how low their search costs are.
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To estimate the parameters of the price distribution, all we need is to observe the prices firms charge over some period of market interaction. We perform Monte Carlo simulations and show that, with relatively few data, the estimate of the price distribution is very accurate while the estimate of the search cost distribution is biased towards high search costs. In addition, ignoring low search cost consumers leads to significant biases in the estimates: search costs are substantially overestimated and price-cost margins largely exaggerated. These biases result in a poor fit of the model to the data and goodness-of-fit tests reject the null hypothesis that the empirical and the estimated distribution of prices are equal.
If the fraction of low search cost consumers were negligible in real-world markets, this
would not be a problem. However, it turns out that the fraction of consumers searching intensively in real-world markets is sizable. We apply our method to a data set of prices for four personal computer memory chips. For all the products, we observe significant price dispersion as measured by the coefficient of variation. On average, relative to buying from one of the firms at random, the gains from being fully informed in these markets are sizable, ranging from 21.56 to 32.89 US dollars. Our estimates of the parameters of the price distribution yield an interesting finding: consumers either search very intensively in the market (between 4% and 13% of the consumers) or search very little, namely for at most three prices. Very few consumers search for an intermediate number of prices. The search cost distribution consistent with these estimates implies that consumers have either quite high or quite low search costs. The estimates suggest that the search cost of consumers who search thoroughly in the market is at most 17 US dollar cents.
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Consumer search behavior confers substantial market power to the firms. In spite of the 3 Brown and Goolsbee (2002) argue that prices of life insurance policies did not fall with rising Internet usage (which probably meant an upward shift of the search cost distribution) but with the emergence of price comparison sites (which most likely meant a more radical change of the shape of the distribution). Picking up such an effect requires information on how the Internet has affected search costs for all quantiles. 4 Using a different methodology, Sorensen (2001) finds that between 5% to 10% of the consumers conduct an exhaustive search for prices in the market for prescription drugs.
fact that in each of the markets studied we observe more than 20 retailers, we estimate that the average price-cost margin ranges between 23% and 28%. This suggests that demand side characteristics like search frictions might be even more important than market structure to assess market competitiveness (Waterson, 2003) .
The validity of the theoretical model is tested, first, by checking whether the data support each of the assumptions of the model and, second, by conducting Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the goodness of fit. According to the test results, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the observed prices are generated by the model. The paper also illustrates how the structural methodology can be employed to simulate the effects of policy interventions. In particular, we study how the introduction of a sales tax would affect the equilibrium outcome in the market for one of the memory chips. We find that sales taxes may affect the equilibrium in non-trivial ways. As a matter of fact, we observe that the tax shifts the price cdf to the right and, depending on the height of the tax rate, this may change significantly the search profile in the economy. For example, a 15% sales tax reduces search in such a way that the tax ends up being passed on to the consumers more than fully and after-tax firms profits increase.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we review and modify the nonsequential consumer search model studied in the paper of Hong and Shum (2006) .
In Section 3 we discuss our maximum likelihood estimation method. Section 4 presents a Monte Carlo study that, among other issues, compares our estimation method with that of Hong and Shum. In Section 5 we estimate the search cost distribution underlying price data obtained from some online markets for memory chips; in addition, this section shows how the market would be affected if a sales tax was introduced. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
The consumer search model
We study an oligopolistic version of the model proposed in Hong and Shum (2006) ; their model generalizes the nonsequential consumer search model of Burdett and Judd (1983) by adding consumer search cost heterogeneity. 5 Assume there are N retailers selling a homogeneous good. Let r be the common unit selling cost of each retailer. There is a unit mass of identical buyers. Each consumer inelastically demands one unit of the good. Let p be the consumer valuation. Beyond the first price, a consumer incurs a search cost c to obtain further price information. Consumers differ in their search costs. Assume that the cost of a consumer is randomly drawn from a distribution of search costs F c . A consumer with search cost c sampling i firms incurs a total search cost ic.
Denote the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium by the distribution of prices F p , with density f p (p). Let p and p be the lower and upper bound of the support of F p . 6 Given firm behavior, the number of prices i(c) a consumer with search cost c observes must be optimal, i.e.,
Since i(c) must be an integer, the problem in equation (1) induces a partition of the set of consumers into N subsets of size q i , i = 1, 2, ..., N , with N i=1 q i = 1; thus, the number q i is the fraction of buyers sampling i firms and is strictly positive for all i. This partition is calculated as follows. Let Ep 1:i be the expected minimum price in a sample of i prices drawn from the price distribution F p . Then
denotes the search cost of the consumer indifferent between sampling i prices and sampling i + 1 prices. Note that ∆ i is a decreasing function of i. Using this, the fractions of consumers q i sampling i prices are simply
Given consumer search behavior it is indeed optimal for firms to mix in prices. The upper bound of the price distribution must be p because a firm which charges the upper bound sells only to the consumers who do not compare prices (consumers in q 1 ), who would also accept p. The equilibrium price distribution follows from the indifference condition that a 6 It will become clear later that the upper bound of the price distribution must be equal to the consumer valuation. firm should obtain the same level of profits from charging any price in the support of F p , i.e.,
From equation (5) it follows that the minimum price charged in the market is
As shown in Hong and Shum (2006) , equations (2) to (6) provide enough structure to allow for the estimation of the search cost distribution using only price data. Since quantity information is often hard to obtain, this will also be the focus of our next section.
Maximum likelihood estimation
Assume the researcher observes the prices of the N firms operating in the market. 7 The objective is to estimate the collection of points
of the search cost distribution by maximum likelihood. Once we get these estimates we can construct an estimate of the search cost distribution by spline approximation. A difficulty here is that equation (5) cannot be solved for the equilibrium price distribution F p and this makes it difficult to calculate the cut-off points
Hong and Shum (2006) propose to use the empirical price distribution to calculate the ∆ i 's.
Even though this approach is practical, it does not necessarily provide minimal variance estimates. We proceed differently and obtain ML estimates of the cut-off points. To do this, we rewrite ∆ i as a function of the ML estimates of the parameters of the price distribution.
This has the advantage that the asymptotic theory for computing the standard errors of ∆ i and for conducting tests of hypotheses remains standard. 8 We first rewrite the cut-off points 7 In practice, sometimes not all the firms are observed by the researcher; our Monte Carlo study in Section 4 examines the implication of this lack of data. 8 Note that for our asymptotic arguments we need that prices are independently and identically distributed in different periods, and since the number of firms is fixed and finite, that the number of periods goes to infinity.
as (by integration by parts)
i dp, i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1.
Since the distribution function F (p) is monotonically increasing in p, its inverse exists. Using equation (5) we can find the inverse function:
Using this inverse function, a change of variables in equation (7) yields:
If we obtain ML estimates of r, p, p and q i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N, then, by the invariance property (see Greene, 1997), we can use equations (8) and (9) to calculate ML estimates of the cut-off points of the search distribution. This procedure yields a ML estimate of the search cost distribution F c (c).
We now discuss how to estimate r, p and q i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N , by maximum likelihood, assuming that the researcher has only price data, which will often be the situation. Since the price density cannot be obtained in closed form, we apply the implicit function theorem to equation (5) , which yields
Let {p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p M } be the vector of observed prices. Without loss of generality, let p 1 < p 2 < . . . < p M . Following Kiefer and Neumann (1993) we take the minimum price in the sample p 1 and the maximum one p M to estimate the lower and upper bounds of the support of the price distribution p and p, respectively. These estimates of the bounds of the price cdf converge super-consistently to the true bounds. 9 Using the estimates of p and p, equation (6) can be solved to obtain the marginal cost r as a function of the other parameters:
Plugging this formula into equation (10) and using the fact that q N = 1 − N −1 i=1 q i we can solve numerically the following maximum likelihood estimation problem:
where
We note that in this formulation the estimate of r is obtained from equation (11) 
A Monte Carlo study
The study in this section has various purposes. First, we investigate how precise the maximum likelihood estimates of the price distribution and of the search cost distribution are when the number of price observations is limited. In particular we are interested in the type 10 The numerical procedure is as follows. We take arbitrary starting values {q
. Then for every price p in the data set we calculate F p (p ) using the equilibrium condition (5), which in turn allows us to calculate f p (p ) using (10) . We use a trust region PCG method, which proceeds by changing the q i 's until the log-likelihood function is maximized.
of bias that the estimation of the upper and lower bound of the price distribution by the maximum and the minimum prices observed in the data may cause. Secondly, we investigate the impact of some measurement error in the number of firms N that operate in the market, since this may be a problem in real-world applications. Finally, we compare our estimation method to that of Hong and Shum (2006).
Performance of the estimates
The general setup of the Monte Carlo experiment is as follows. We assume that consumers' search costs are drawn independently from a log-normal distribution with parameters ν = 0.5 and σ = 5. Further, the value of the product p is assumed to be 100 and the unit cost r to be 50. To solve for equilibrium, we compute numerically the fractions {q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q N } for which equations (4a)-(4c) and (9) hold simultaneously. Next, we use these parameters to construct the equilibrium price distribution, implicitly defined by equation (5) . After this, we draw prices randomly from the cdf of prices, which serve as input for the maximum likelihood estimation procedure described in the previous section. We replicate each of our experiments 1000 times and report the mean and the 90% confidence interval of the estimates we obtain.
In this subsection we set N = 25. The first column of Table 1 gives the true parameter (equilibrium) values. We see that the primitives chosen lead to an equilibrium where price dispersion is substantial. In particular, the lowest price of the equilibrium price distribution is 51.68, which is about half the maximum price, 100. Thus, in equilibrium gains from search are quite significant. We also note that a firm charging the minimum price has a relative price-cost margin (Lerner index) of only 3.36% while for the firm charging the maximum price the same index is 50%.
In equilibrium a great deal of the consumers, about 38%, search for only one price;
another important group of buyers searchers for all the prices in the market (about 31% of the consumers). The fractions of consumers searching for an intermediate number of prices (from 2 to 24 firms) are pretty small, in all cases less than about 3% and often close to zero.
11 11 This feature of the equilibrium partition of the set of consumers that few consumers search for an intermediate number of firms is somewhat special and has to do with the choice of search cost distribution. For example, in a 10 firm market where the search cost distribution is a twenty-eighty percent mixture of a log-normal with parameters 0.5 and 2 and a gamma distribution with parameters 0.5 and 0.2, the equilibrium As discussed above, for the estimation of the model we need to assume that market interaction evolves over a finite number of T ≥ 2 periods. We take the equilibrium of the static game described in Section 2 as the equilibrium of the repeated game with finite horizon.
Our first set of estimations assumes the market evolves over T = 4 periods so we draw a total of 100 price observations each time we run the estimation procedure.
The second column of Table 1 gives the results of our first set of estimations. The numbers reported are the mean of the 1000 estimates of the parameters with corresponding standard errors in parenthesis. We observe that the estimate of the fraction of consumers who search for one price only is about 45% and highly significant. This estimate is about 7% higher than the true value so the fraction of consumers who do not compare prices at all is overestimated.
has most of the consumers searching intensively (around 75% more than 8 times) and very few consumers not searching at all (around 4%).
The estimate of the fraction of consumers searching for two prices is also significant and again overestimated (3.7% instead of 3.2%). The estimate of the fraction of consumers searching for all prices in the market is about 20%, somewhat lower than the true parameter (31.4%).
The estimates of the rest of the parameters are not significantly different from zero (at the 5% level). Since the true parameters are close to zero anyway, it turns out that this does not represent a problem for the estimate of the price distribution to exhibit a good fit. In sum we see that the fractions of consumers searching little are overestimated while the fractions of consumers searching a lot are underestimated. Arguably the implication of these biases is that the estimate of the search cost distribution will be biased towards high search costs. Table 2 reports the true cut-off points of the search cost distribution.
The second column gives the estimated ones when we set T = 4. We see that all the estimates of the cut-off points are highly significant, and quite close to the true ones.
The price and search cost cdf's as well as their mean estimates are plotted in Figure   1 (a) and 1(b) respectively. In both graphs the black curves are the true distributions while the dashed-black curves show the mean of the 1000 estimated distributions. The dashed red curves are respectively the 5% percentile and the 95% percentile of the estimates. We observe that the estimate of the price distribution is remarkably close to the true price cdf.
However, the estimate of the search cost distribution lies below the true one. In spite of this, the true distribution falls (for its most part) within the 90% confidence interval.
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The fact that the estimate of the search cost distribution lies below the true cdf might be a reflection of the fact that the fractions of consumers searching little are overestimated.
Since the estimate of the upper bound of the price cdf with a limited amount of data will be lower than the true one, while, at the same time, the estimate of the lower bound of the price cdf will be higher than the true one, the price distribution might very well be less dispersed than the true one. This implies that gains from search might very well be lower than in equilibrium, which is consistent with estimates of the search cost distribution being biased towards higher search costs.
To see whether the downward bias of the estimated search cost distribution can be attributed to the biased estimation of the upper and lower bound of the price cdf, we conduct the following experiment. We assume that the econometrician knows the true upper and lower bounds and then re-estimate the model. The dashed red curve in Figure 2 (a) shows the new estimate of the search cost distribution. To compare with the previous estimates, we also plot in gray the search cost distribution when the upper and the lower bounds are 12 The last cut-off point of the search cost distribution we can estimate is c 1 and therefore we do not have information about search costs beyond that point.
estimated by the minimum and the maximum price. The graph reveals that the new estimate is much closer to the true distribution than the previous one. The average estimate of q 1 goes down 0.04 points and this results in an upward shift of the estimated search cost cdf. 
Measurement error in the number of firms
The econometrician might often encounter the problem that he/she does no know the exact number of retailers operating in a market. To investigate the impact of measurement error in the number of firms N , we conducted two experiments. In the first experiment we set N equal to 20 instead of equal to the true value 25. This experiment captured a situation where the econometrician observes N with some but not very large error (20% fewer firms). The results can be seen in Figure 2 (b). As the graph shows, the underestimation of the number In the second experiment, we set N equal to 4 instead of equal to 25. In this case, the econometrician measures the number of firms with a pretty large error. Note that this is equivalent to assuming that low search cost consumers are ignored altogether, which should be reflected in the estimate of the search cost distribution. Figure 4 gives the estimation results. In panel 4(a) we plot the estimated price cdf and the true empirical price distribution.
Clearly, the fit is much worse than if we had estimated N more or less correctly (see Figures   1(a) and 2(b) ). This has a large impact on the estimates of search cost and marginal cost parameters. As can be seen in Figure 4 (b), the estimated search cost cdf is far from the true one. In particular, the estimates lead to the wrong conclusion that search costs are much higher than what they actually are. Likewise, this translates into an average pricecost margin being largely exaggerated; in particular around 100%, while the true price-cost margin of a typical firm is 42%.
In sum, this subsection suggests that the estimates of the search cost cdf are meaningful even when the econometrician does not know the exact number of firms operating in the market but has a fair estimate of it, and clarifies the nature of the bias introduced by this type of measurement error.
Comparison of the ML estimation method and Hong and Shum (2006) method
Hong and Shum (2006) propose to estimate the parameters of the price distribution by maximum empirical likelihood (MEL) and the cutoff points of the search cost distribution by using the empirical distribution of prices. In this subsection we compare the performance of our method relative to the one of Hong and Shum.
Before proceeding with the simulation results, let us revise briefly their approach. 13 Suppose we have a data set containing M prices. Consider the discrete price distribution
with M mass points, each price p j charged with probability π j . Using the equilibrium condition (5), each price i = 1, 2, ..., M − 1 in the data set satisfies
where, as before, r and q N can be eliminated from these expressions using the formula for the lower bound of the price distribution and the summing up condition N k=1 q k = 1, respectively. The equations in (13) can be transformed into moment conditions as follows.
For s ∈ [0, 1], = 1, 2, ..., L we have
Hong and Shum (2006) write these population quantile restrictions as
The empirical likelihood problem consists of maximizing M j=1 log π j subject to the constraints in (15) and the condition M j=1 π j = 1 with respect to the probabilities π j 's and the parameters {q 1 , q 2 , ..., q N −1 }. It turns out that the MEL estimates of the parameters can be obtained from solving the saddle-point problem:
where t denotes the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints in equation (13) .
The MEL estimates of the parameters of the price distribution form the ordinates of the cutoff points of the search cost distribution. To find the abscissas of the cutoff points Hong and Shum propose to use the empirical cdf of prices in equation (7) above.
The maximum empirical likelihood method of Hong and Shum requires to solve a constrained optimization problem where the number of constraints equals, potentially, the num- Table 2 ) and by other authors (see e.g. Qin and Lawless, 1994 and Owen, 1990) . To overcome the numerical problems, Hong and Shum (2006) suggest not to use all moment conditions but a small subset of them;
we followed this approach in our initial set of simulations and still encountered difficulties.
The reason is that in our initial set of simulations we considered a market operated by a large number of firms, in particular N = 25.
To be able to perform a comparison of the two methods, we studied a market with fewer firms, in particular we set N = 10; the rest of the parameters were kept the same as in the main set of simulations. Even in this case of 10 firms, we experienced some numerical difficulties but, fortunately, they became salvageable in limited time by trying several starting values in case of no-convergence. The results of the simulations are reported in Tables 2(a) and 2(b). Table 2 (a) reports the true parameters of the price distribution along with the MEL and ML estimates. As in the above experiments, the equilibrium has the features that the group of consumers searching only once is fairly large (about 37%) and that the fraction of consumers searching thoroughly is also sizable (about 42%). The second column of the Table   shows that the MEL method is unable to capture the effect on prices of the consumers who search intensively; in fact, this parameter is quite poorly estimated, which would wrongly suggest that search costs are higher than what they really are. By contrast, as it can be seen in the third column of the Table our ML procedure yields a pretty good estimate of this parameter, as well as the others; in fact it can be seen that except for the estimates of q 1 and q 2 , all ML estimates are closer to the true parameters than the MEL estimates.
Table 2(b) shows the true cutoff points of the search cost distribution, along with corresponding estimates based on the empirical cdf of prices and maximum likelihood. It can be seen that the estimates using the empirical price cdf are closer to the true parameters but they generate larger standard errors than the ML estimates.
These differences between the two methods are reflected both in the estimate of the price cdf as well as in the estimate of the search cost distribution, which can be seen in Figure 5 . On the basis of this evidence, we conclude that our ML procedure outperforms the hybrid procedure described in Hong and Shum, both from a numerical as well as from a goodnessof-fit point of view.
5 Empirical application
Data and empirical issues
In this section we apply our estimation procedure to data obtained from real-world markets.
Before presenting the results, we discuss the data set and, following Lach (2002) , check one by one the assumptions of the theoretical model. This also serves to identify the potential weaknesses and caveats of this empirical exercise.
The focus of the study is on on-line consumer markets for personal computer memory chips. At the time of data collection, the four memory chips we study were sold in stores advertising prices on the price comparison site www.shopper.com so we used this site to sample the prices of the firms over time.
14 Shopper.com is one of the largest price comparison sites on the Internet. 15 Internet shops get listed on shopper.com by subscribing to CNET, the owner of shopper.com. Stores can choose between three types of listing schemes, general, preferred or premier. Preferred or premier listing allows a shop to add a store logo. Shops can provide once or twice a day price information by uploading a so-called "price feed," but it is not necessary to do so if a shop does not desire to alter its price. The feed is collected four times a day and published on shopper.com. Shops are required to fill in eight fields in the feed: credit card price, 14 Since some consumers may proceed as we did and use the search engine to sample prices, an implicit assumption for our sampling method to be reasonable is that firms do not price discriminate between regular visitors to their web sites and visitors of search engines. We have manually checked this assumption and found overwhelming evidence that firms announce the same price in their web sites and in the search engines. Our estimate of q N will of course include those individuals who use the search engine so our interpretation for these consumers is that they have search costs less than ∆ N −1 . Under this interpretation, our estimates give the search costs of those consumers buying memory chips online. 15 We are implicitly assuming that retailers, dealers, computer manufacturers, etc. buy from agents in the value chain other than the firms advertising in shopper.com, or directly from the memory chip manufacturers. manufacturer name, manufacturer Stock Keeping Unit (SKU), product URL, product name, availability, shipping and handling cost, and category.
By using a so-called "spider" computer code, we automatically collected this information for the four memory chips directly from shopper.com, from the beginning of August 2004 till the end of September 2004. Unfortunately we could not collect more data because the IP address of the computer we were using to download the data was blocked by the system managers of shopper.com at the end of September 2004.
A first caveat of the study is that fitting the model in Section 2 to data from on-line markets assumes implicitly that consumers search for prices nonsequentially. Even though nonsequential search may be a good approximation of buyer behavior when consumers use web sites, web forums, and search engines to find price information, a caveat of the analysis is that sequential search might be a more adequate search protocol to model search activity on the World Wide Web. 16 We selected four memory chips all manufactured by Kingston, which is by far the largest It may be argued that different memory chips are in the same relevant market so a differentiated products market model is more appropriate than our model with homogeneous products. To avoid this problem to the extent possible, we included in the analysis only memory chips intended for particular PC's. More concretely, we chose two memory chips for notebooks, one intended for Toshiba notebooks and the other for Dell Inspiron notebooks.
Arguably, consumers who own for example a Toshiba Satellite 5105 notebook and are contemplating to extend its memory by 512 MB would most likely consider to buy only the 16 For details on the optimality of nonsequential and sequential search see Morgan and Manning (1985) .
Kingston KTT3614 memory chip (see www.toshiba.com). 17 The other two memory chips are intended for Dell desktop computers, in particular for the Dimension series.
Another form of heterogeneity we are ignoring is store differentiation. Like in Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004) , it would be reasonable to assume that consumers may sample the firms with unequal probability, simply because some firms are more popular than others, or because they advertise more effectively than others. The main problem with this extension is that we would need quantity data to estimate the model, which we do not have.
We view the markets under study as consumer markets, where the typical buyer is an individual consumer. In this sense, the usual buyer is expected to buy a single chip to upgrade the memory capacity of his/her computer; indeed, often computers have just a single slot available for memory upgrades. As a result, the inelastic demand assumption of the model seems reasonable here. The summary statistics of the data can be found in Table 5 . We found distinct numbers of stores operating in different markets but in all cases the number was quite high. For the KTT3614 memory chip, 25 firms were seen quoting prices over the period under study; for the KTDINSP8200 and KTD4400 chips we collected prices from 24 different stores and for the KTD8300 chip we found 23 stores.
In our study, we estimated N by the total number of firms which were listed in shopper.com. This number is based on the sample of firms that advertise in shopper.com and is probably lower than the true number of stores in the relevant market. Our Monte Carlo simulations above show the extent of the bias introduced by measurement errors in N . If the true number of retailers is not dramatically different than our estimate of N the results, though biased, will be economically meaningful.
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Not every firm was quoting a price every week. For example, for the KTT3614 memory chip we saw an average of 22.4 stores quoting a price in a typical week. The lowest number of stores for this product was 20 and the highest number of stores was 24. Similar figures were found for the other products (see Table 5 ). There might be several reasons for this variation.
For some stores there were missing values somewhere in the middle of the sampling period.
This might be due to technical problems when uploading the price feed to shopper.com. We also observed that some stores appeared in the sample only after some weeks had passed. In any case, on average, a typical firm was quoting prices during more than 88% of the sample period (7 weeks out of 8).
The estimations are conducted under the assumption that firms play a stationary repeated game of finite horizon so the data in every period should reflect the equilibrium of the static game analyzed in Section 2. This assumption has some testable implications. One, since the equilibrium is in mixed strategies, prices should be dispersed at any given moment in time. Two, since firms are supposed to draw prices from the same price cdf period after period, there should be variation in the position of a typical firm in the price ranking and prices should not exhibit serial correlation. Third, stationarity of the environment implies that price cdf's should be similar across periods, i.e., that supply or demand shocks have been absent during the sample period. We now examine how these three features appear in the data. Table 5 shows the mean price and corresponding standard deviation of prices, for each product. As expected, memory chips for notebooks are on average more expensive than those intended for desktop computers; moreover, the KTD8300 chip is more expensive than the KTD4400 chip due to its faster speed of operation. For all the products, we observe significant price dispersion as measured by the coefficient of variation. On average, relative to buying from one of the firms at random, the gains from being fully informed in this market are sizable, ranging from 21.56 to 32.89 US dollars.
A careful examination of the data reveals that most stores certainly change their price from time to time, but we observe that they do not do it synchronously, that is, the length of time between price revisions changes from firm to firm. For example, in the market for the KTT3614 memory chip, 20 stores out of 25 changed their price at least once during the period under study. On average, a typical firm selling the KTT3614 chip changed the price once every 5 weeks but while some firms did change their prices several times over the sample period (up to 5 times), other firms did not. For the other memory chips, we found similar patterns. 19 The reason for this variation may be due to menu cost dispersion across firms.
We also observe some variation in the price ranking of a typical firm. For example, for the KTT3614 memory chip the standard deviation of the ranking of a firm ranges from 0 to 3.77. This is somewhat smaller than what we would expect on the basis of the theoretical model.
One reason for these findings might be the short length of time of the sample period because some of the firms did not alter their prices. 20 To check this hypothesis, we gathered prices at the time of writing this paper and compared the current ranking of a typical firm with that at the time of data collection (one year ago). For example, for the KTT3614 memory chip, we found 21 stores quoting prices so some stores are no longer active in this market. This is not surprising since this market evolves very rapidly so after one year a product may be somewhat outdated. Of these 21 stores, 16 stores were either higher or lower in the ranking compared to one year ago. The difference in ranking ranged from 0 to 7 and was on average of 2.48. Finally, 9 stores out of 21 are now in a different quartile of the ranking distribution.
19 A typical firm selling the KTDINSP8200 chip changed its price once every 6 weeks, once every 7 weeks for the KTD4400 chip and once every 6 weeks for the KTD8300 memory chip.
20 Lach (2002) examined the Israeli markets for chicken, coffee, flour and refrigerators during 48 months. The median duration of a store's ranking in a given quartile ranged from 1 month for coffee and chicken to 2 to 3 months for flour and refrigerators; in that period most of the firms were seen quoting prices in all quartiles of the price distribution.
Similar figures apply to the other memory chips.
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To check for serial correlation, we calculated the autocorrelation function (ACF) for each product at each store, i.e.,
where p av denotes the store's average price for the product. The results are summarized in Table 6 . Although the number of observations for each store-product pair is too small for the autocorrelations to be estimated precisely, this evidence suggests that serial correlation is not a serious issue in our data set. Store-product pairs for which we had fewer than eight observations are excluded, as well as pairs for which we observed no variation over time. If the autocorrelation is within ±2/ √ T , where T = 8 is the number of observations over time, it is not significantly different from zero at (approximately) the 5% significance level. For all autocorrelations this is the case. Table 6 : Summary autocorrelations store-product pairs
To check whether absence of demand and supply shocks is a reasonable assumption in our data set we tested the null hypothesis that price distributions in two different periods were equal using two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. The results indicate that for the KTD4400 and KTD8300 memory chips, the null hypothesis that the distributions are the same cannot be rejected for any possible pair of periods, at a 5% significance level. For the other two memory chips, the KTT3614 and the KTDINSP8200, the null hypothesis was rejected only for pairs of periods that included the last period, which suggests that for these memory chips the last period is somewhat different than earlier periods.
The prices used for our estimations include neither shipping costs nor sales taxes. One reason for not including shipping costs in the main analysis is that we do not have the data for all the stores. 23 Another reason is that shipping costs and sales taxes depend on the state in which the consumer lives, which makes it difficult to compare total prices. In spite of these considerations, for robustness purposes, we also estimated the model neglecting sales taxes but using the shipping costs as if we were living in New York. Since a store not providing shipping cost information cannot be considered to ship for free (otherwise they would announce it as a promotional strategy), either we visited the web sites to discover shipping costs or we attributed average shipping costs to the missing values. The qualitative nature of the results did not change in these two cases.
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Some of the variation in prices may be due to store differentiation. Consumers might view some stores more appealing than others and base this view on observable store characteristics like firm reputation, return policies, stock availability, order fulfillment, payment methods, etc. Unfortunately, we do not have information on all these indicators. But we do have information on whether the item was in stock or not, on whether firms disclosed shipping cost on shopper.com or not and on the CNET certified ranking of a store, which is a store quality index computed by CNET on the basis of consumer feedback. To see the impact of these (observable) variables on the prices of each memory chip in our data set, we estimated the following model:
where, for each product, P RICE jt is the list price of store j in week t, RAT IN G jt is the CNET certified ranking of store j in week t, SHIP jt is a dummy for whether shop j disclosed shipping cost in week t, and ST OCK jt is a dummy for whether shop j had the item in stock in week t. We estimated equation (17) by OLS. The resulting R-squared values indicate that only between 6% and 17% of the total variation in prices can be attributed to observable differences in store characteristics. 25 This suggests that the rest of the price 23 Actually stores may choose to report blank in the shipping and handling cost field of the price feed form. As a result, shopper.com reports "See Site" in the shipping and handling column for that particular store. 24 Tables containing the estimates using the data including shipping costs, as well as plots of the resulting search cost distributions and fitted price cdf's can be obtained from the authors upon request. 25 For all memory chips, the OLS estimates of the coefficient of SHIP jt are negative and highly significant.
variation can be due to strategic price setting in the presence of search costs or to unobserved firm heterogeneity.
The finding that quite a few stores do change their price often and also that store rankings change from week to week gives an indication that store heterogeneity cannot be the only factor in explaining price setting behavior.
To check to what extent unobserved heterogeneity across shops (e.g. based on brand recognition, or on marginal cost) plays an important role in explaining price setting behavior in our data set, we regressed prices on a constant and a set of store dummies. In this case the R-squared was very high, ranging from 0.93 to 0.99.
However, given the short period of data collection and given the observation that within this 8 week period quite a few firms either did not change their price at all, or changed it only once, these high R-squared values are not very surprising. Actually, in a related study of online prices, using a similar kind of data set which extends over a much longer period of time find that unobserved firm heterogeneities (in costs, branding, trust, etc.) can only explain up to 72% of the variation in prices. 26 Still, a caveat of the current model is that it cannot control for this unobserved firm heterogeneity and that it treats all variation in the price data as variation due to search frictions.
Estimation results
The estimation results for the four different memory chips are presented in Table 7 . An interesting observation is that even though the products differ in their characteristics, the estimates are quite similar across memory chips. This suggests that the consumers acquiring these products have similar search cost distributions.
The estimates of the share of consumers who search once, q 1 , range from 22% to 30%
and are all highly significant. 27 These consumers do not compare prices and thus confer
The estimates of the coefficient of RAT IN G jt are positive and significant on a 1% level for the KTDINSP8200 chip, significant on a 10% level for the KTT3614 and KTD4400 chips and not significant for the KTD8300 chip. The coefficient of ST OCK jt was not significant for any of the products, but this could be due to the lack of variation of this variable in our data (upon reporting on shopper.com, almost all stores had the product in stock). 26 Lach (2002) presents a similar finding for a data set of prices for goods sold in physical stores located in Israel. 27 To be able to calculate the standard errors, we deleted the columns and rows of the Hessian for which the corresponding parameter estimates were zero. Table 7 : Estimation results monopoly power to the firms. Firms compete for the rest of the consumers, who happen to search for 2 or 3 prices or for all the prices in the market. In particular, the estimates of q 2 range from 39% for the KTT3614 memory chip to 68% for the KTD4400 chip and are highly significant as well. The KTT3614 chip has also a sizable share of consumers comparing three prices, about 31%. For all the products, the estimates of parameters q 4 till q N −1 are all approximately zero. Finally, the estimates of the fraction of consumers comparing all the prices in the market, q N , range from 4% to 13% and are, except for the KTD3614 memory chip, significant at a 5% level.
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These results suggest a clear picture of consumer search costs. The entire consumer population can roughly be grouped into three subsets: buyers who do not search, buyers who compare at most three prices and buyers who compare all the prices in the market. This is consistent with the view that consumers have either quite high search costs or quite low search costs.
The estimated cut-off points of the search cost distribution, ∆ i , with corresponding standard errors are presented in Table 8 . All the cut-off points are highly significant and notice again that there is very little variation in the estimates across products. The estimated critical search cost values in combination with the estimated shares of consumers searching i times allow us to construct estimates of the search cost distributions underlying firm and Figure 6 gives the estimated cumulative search cost distributions for the four memory chips. For example for the KTT3614 memory chip we see that around 22% of the consumers have search costs higher than 12.26 US dollars; these costs are so high that these consumers only search once in equilibrium. Around 70% of the consumers have search costs in between 2.21 and 12.26 US dollars and for these consumers it is worth to search 2 or 3 times. Finally, around 8% of the buyers have search costs that are at most 9 dollar cents; these costs are so low that these buyers check the prices of all vendors. In sum, these estimates imply that typical on-line consumers have either very high search costs or very low search costs.
In spite of having more than 20 stores operating in each of the markets, we observe that market power is substantial. The estimates of r indicate that unit costs are between 50% and 53% of the value of the product so the average price-cost margins range between 23% and 28%. 29 This is of course the consequence of search costs, suggesting that demand side characteristics might be even more important than supply side ones to assess market We finally test the goodness of fit of the model. To see how well the estimated price density function fits the data, we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS-test) to compare the actual distribution to the fitted distribution. 30 The KS-test is based on the maximum difference between the empirical cdf and the hypothesized estimated cdf. The null hypothesis for this test is that they have the same distribution, the alternative hypothesis is that they have different distributions. As Table 7 shows, since all KS values are below the 95%-critical value of the KS-statistic, which is 1.36, for all four memory chips we cannot reject that the prices are drawn from the estimated price distribution. 31 The goodness of fit of the model to the data can be visualized in Figure 7 . A solid curve represents an empirical price distribution, while a dashed curve represents an estimated one. 
The effects of a sales tax
The value of estimating a structural model of demand and supply is that the aggregate implications of policy changes can be computed by generating what would be the afterpolicy equilibrium. To illustrate this feature, in this section we study the effects of a sales tax in the market for the KTDINSP8200 memory chip.
Denoting by t the ad valorem tax rate, a firm charging p receives a pricep = (1 − t)p.
Therefore, in the presence of a sales tax, the equilibrium equation (5) is rewritten as
The upper bound of the price distribution continues to be equal to v while the lower bound 30 In this table KS is calculated as √ M · τ M , where M is the number of observations and τ M is the maximum absolute difference over all prices between the estimated price cdf and the empirical price cdf.
31 Because some of the parameters that enter the test are estimated we also calculated the Rao-Robson Statistic, which is a kind of chi-squared test corrected for the uncertainty involved in estimating some of the parameters of the distribution that has to be fitted (for more details see Moore, 1986 ). The Rao-Robson statistics for two of the four products are below their corresponding critical values (KTT3614 and KTD4400), which means that for these products we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the estimated and empirical price cdf are the same. 32 We also tried to estimate the model using the method of Hong and Shum (2006) . Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain meaningful estimates. We encountered exactly the same problems as those reported in Section 4.3, i.e., the algorithm either did not move away from the starting values or did not converge. The reason is that the number of stores we observe in the data is quite high. 
Using these two equations, we can simulate the implications of sales taxes on equilibrium.
Before moving to the results, we note that we first need to have a suitable (smooth) estimate of the search cost distribution. For this purpose, we fit a mixture of lognormals to the search cost points obtained in the estimation section (see Figure 6 
The fitted curve and the estimated points of the search cost distribution can be seen in Figure 8 (a). Using this estimate, we simulate the effects of a 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% sales tax. The results are reported in Table 9 while the original and the different post-tax equilibrium price distributions are drawn in Figure 8(b) . As the graph shows, the introduction of a tax results in a rightward shift of the price distribution so all consumers end-up paying higher final prices. What is interesting is that a tax, by compressing the price distribution, changes the incentives to search in the economy. Inspection of columns 3 to 6 in Table 9 reveals that as the tax increases, the number of consumers who do not exercise price comparisons increases.
For example, when the tax is 20% (last column of the table) this number is about 83% which implies that firms can charge prices quite close to monopoly (average price is indeed 194.28
US dollars, quite close to valuation, which is 200.50 US dollars).
How much of the tax is passed along to the consumers turns out to depend on the height of the sales tax. A relatively small tax (5%) does not alter significantly the search profile in the economy and, though prices increase for all consumers, only about 5% is passed on to them; after-tax firm profits are lower than in the case of no taxation (see columns 2 and 3 of Table 9 ). By contrast, a higher tax, for example 15%, ends-up reducing the gains from search substantially; in that case, the average price paid by the consumers who only search once increases by 16%, while the price the consumers who search thoroughly expect to pay increases by 18.7%. In sum a consumer at random pays a price about 18% higher and this leads to after-tax profits that are higher than in the absence of taxes (see columns 2 and 5 of 
Conclusions
Consumer search models have shown for example that, depending on the nature of search costs in the market, an increase in the number of firms can increase or decrease the price levels and price dispersion. Since competition policy recommendations may depend on the nature of the search cost distribution, there is a need to develop methods to identify and quantify search costs. Hong and Shum (2006) were the first to exploit the restrictions equilibrium search models place on the joint distribution of prices and search costs to structurally estimate unobserved search cost parameters. Following up on this line of work, this paper has presented a new method to estimate search costs. Our method has three important features. First, we use a model with a finite number of firms, which helps separate variation in prices caused by variation the number of competitors from variation in search frictions. Second, our method yields maximum likelihood estimates of search cost parameters, which allows for standard asymptotic theory and hypothesis testing. Finally, our method is relatively easy to implement in practice, the algorithm converges very rapidly and we have not observed numerical problems.
Using a data set of prices for four memory chips we find that between 4% and 13% of the consumers search for all prices in the market. These consumers have a search cost of at most 17 US dollar cents and obtain sizable gains relative to buying from one of the firms at random, namely, from 21 to 33 US dollars. Our estimates of the consumer search cost density underlying the price observations for the memory chips suggest that consumers have either quite low or quite high search costs. Even though quite a few firms operate in the markets we study, search frictions confer significant market power to the firms. The estimates reveal that average price-cost margins range from 23% to 28%. Finally, according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the price observations were drawn from the distribution functions specified by the theoretical search model. The paper also illustrates how the structural methodology can be employed to simulate the effects of policy interventions. In particular, we study how the introduction of a sales tax would affect the equilibrium outcome in one of the markets studied above. We find that a sales tax reduces the gains from search and this may affect the equilibrium in unexpected ways.
